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Abstract
A large number of randomized clinical trials with important health outcomes are completed each
year. Those with favorable findings are typically reported and published rapidly, while the
publication of those with unfavorable results is often delayed or given a positive "spin." This
observation applies primarily to industry-sponsored trials. Our objectives are to discuss the
responsibility of pharmaceutical firms to the public with respect to timely, complete, and unbiased
information from all randomized clinical trials and to propose solutions for improvements. We
believe that in addition to financial obligations to their shareholders, pharmaceutical companies
have social responsibilities to the public and to health care providers. However, private markets
do not reward or compel optimal disclosure of drug safety or inferiority information on a voluntary
basis.
A problem which has not previously been identified relates to non-comparability of drugs. A case
report from the Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial
(ALLHAT) illustrates how public interests may be violated due to failure to inform about drug
inferiority. The current system for dissemination of relevant medical information could be
improved if all involved parties collaborated fully. However, full disclosure of trial results is unlikely
when research results are unfavorable to the firm. We conclude that expanded government
regulations will be required for a satisfactory solution to the problem.
Introduction
A large number of randomized clinical trials of patient
care and public health importance are completed each
year. It is essential that their findings, favorable or unfavo-
rable, be published and disseminated in a timely, com-
plete and unbiased manner. Not surprisingly, trials with
positive results tend to be reported more quickly, and the
sponsor, if a pharmaceutical company, typically and
appropriately has an active involvement in this process.
Regrettably, trials with unfavorable findings – neutral or
suggestive of harm in placebo-controlled designs, or indif-
ferent or inferior in active-control designs – tend to be
treated differently. One strategy is to delay or withhold
publication. Ioannidis [1] reported that for negative trials,
the time from trial completion to publication was almost
twice that for positive trials. Many negative trials are never
published [2]. In rare instances, manufacturers have used
legal means to try to block the publication of unfavorable
trial results [3,4]. Another strategy is to try to use a publi-
cation as "an advertisement in the clothing of science" [5].
At times, manufacturers exert undue pressure on investi-
gators to give trial results a more positive "spin" [6,7]. The
observation from a large survey that as many as 96–99%
of trials from China, Russia/USSR, and Taiwan reported
positive findings also suggests the possibility of sponsor
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to these concerns by announcing plans to reject articles
"conducted under conditions that allow the sponsor sole
control of the data or to withhold publication" [9]. A
problem not previously identified relates to trials compar-
ing two or more drugs. Is information about drug superi-
ority and inferiority properly disseminated to physicians
and patients?
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is charged by
Congress to approve drugs for clinical use and to provide
essential drug information through labeling to clinicians
and patients. Its mandate to protect the public from
unsafe drugs does not, however, extend to assessing com-
parative efficacy or to warning physicians or patients
about inferior products. The problem of inadequate dis-
semination of unfavorable safety information exists, since
FDA is reactive in its mission and has no systematic
approach to detect omissions.
Given the weaknesses in the dissemination process, it is
the pharmaceutical industry that has assumed the major
role of directly informing individual health professionals
and the public about drug trial results. Through large net-
works of pharmaceutical representatives, sponsorship of
promotional meetings, continuing medical education
programs and advertisements, the industry has the capac-
ity to control this function not only when the results are
favorable but when they are unfavorable as well. How-
ever, can we trust that the knowledge and resources they
have are used to provide timely, complete and unbiased
information when the results are unfavorable?
The social responsibility of the pharmaceutical industry
Ideally, a socially responsible drug company would be
expected to take the following four steps in the dissemina-
tion of all relevant trial results to all relevant parties:
(1) Initiate timely and complete updates of the package
inserts. According to current regulations, it is the manufac-
turer's responsibility to inform the FDA regarding rele-
vant, new trial documentation, favorable or unfavorable,
and to collaborate with the agency to revise inserts accord-
ingly. Findings from drug trials that show clinical benefit
or comparative superiority/inferiority could be added
under the insert heading "Indications and Usage," while
adverse reactions – depending on their severity – might be
included under such headings as "Contraindications,"
"Warnings," "Precautions" or "Adverse Reactions." An
important improvement would be to require that labeling
changes be highlighted to show new information.
Updated package inserts serve as source material for clini-
cians seeking specific drug information. By mandate, the
FDA has no direct role in this dissemination process.
(2) Concurrently contact health care providers with direct
written communications. The manufacturer ought to
inform health care providers directly about major labeling
changes that are relevant to patient care. These changes
could include new drug indications, stronger supportive
evidence of clinical benefit, but also evidence of safety
concerns and comparative superiority/inferiority. How-
ever, the impact of such written communications and
labeling changes alone have little or no impact on physi-
cian prescribing behavior and on recommended patient
monitoring [10-13].
(3) Concurrently reinforce research messages verbally to
individual clinicians. The most effective way to inform
physicians about new and important drug information is
through face-to-face encounters [14,15]. This type of
detailing is already being used effectively to promote trial
results to increase drug sales. Although equally important,
unfavorable results are commonly either minimized or
not presented by the representatives. Legal actions taken
against manufacturers of drugs shown to cause harm have
revealed that critical safety information sometimes is
withheld from both clinicians and regulatory agencies
[16-18].
(4) Concurrently employ mass media approaches to reach
patients. The industry has refined ways of reaching
patients through direct to consumer advertising of drugs.
This is an important way of increasing sales and informing
the public. Public health authorities mount various media
campaigns to change unhealthy behaviors. Similar tech-
niques should be used to inform the public about drug
safety and inferiority concerns since it has the right to
know. This could be paid for through sources similar to
those that support public health campaigns, or funds
could come through an ear-marked assessment targeted to
the pharmaceutical industry or the sale of its products.
Acceptance and implementation of these responsibilities
would markedly reduce our societal problem of drug
safety and inferiority. Can we presume that all companies
are good citizens?
Case report: ALLHAT
In 1994, the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
(NHLBI) launched the Antihypertensive and Lipid Lower-
ing to prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT), designed to
guide clinicians in making educated selections of antihy-
pertensive agents by providing outcome data related to
risk-benefit balance and cost-effectiveness. Specifically,
ALLHAT was designed to determine whether the newer
and more costly agents – ACE inhibitors, calcium channel
blockers, and alpha-blockers – were more effective than
inexpensive low-dose generic diuretics (chlorthalidone)
in reducing the risk of major coronary events and otherPage 2 of 5
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to reduce the risks of cardiovascular events by 25% and to
cut the risk of heart failure in half compared to the alpha-
blocker, doxazosin. The ALLHAT results were so convinc-
ing that the doxazosin treatment arm was terminated early
and all patients assigned to this drug were advised to
switch to other medications [20]. The findings were pub-
lished in the Journal of the American Medical Association in
April, 2000 following an expedited review [21].
The ALLHAT findings have important health and cost
implications. If the excess absolute risk of fatal, hospital-
ized, and non-hospitalized heart failure of using doxa-
zosin (Cardura) is 1%/yr (as shown in ALLHAT) and there
are 500,000 Cardura users in the United States, there will
be 5,000 unnecessary initial heart failure cases every year.
This number would almost double if the ALLHAT findings
also apply to other alpha-blockers and to patients pre-
scribed Cardura for indications other than hypertension.
There were also higher risks of stroke, angina and coro-
nary revascularizations. According to a recent Medical Let-
ter [22], Cardura, for example, was priced at $30.90 per
month compared to generic chlorthalidone at $5.40 per
month. The adverse events themselves require additional
health care expenditures, making the total societal cost of
Cardura even higher.
How did Pfizer respond?
(1) Pfizer never submitted the ALLHAT data or the JAMA
article [21] to the FDA, in order to initiate a labeling
change. The FDA only got involved through a Citizen Peti-
tion [23] that was filed after a failed lawsuit against Pfizer
by two patients. An FDA Hearing [24] was held more than
14 months after the ALLHAT results were made public
through an NHLBI press release [20]. A revised package
insert for Cardura ought to state clearly that in elderly
patients with hypertension, the drug is inferior to low-
dose diuretics (chlorthalidone) in the prevention of con-
gestive heart failure, stroke, angina, and coronary revascu-
larizations.
(2) Pfizer never issued a "Dear Doctor" letter to inform
health care professionals about the important findings
from ALLHAT, in spite of the fact that it agreed with the
NHLBI decision to stop the doxazosin arm in ALLHAT. If
human subject protection obligations required the ALL-
HAT investigators to inform participants and switch them
from doxazosin to another agent, it follows that the com-
pany also had obligations to inform the public of the trial
findings. If the size of a trial or the passage of time makes
contacting individual patients impractical, informing the
relevant community of physicians is the next best alterna-
tive, since they have a professional obligation to pass this
information on to patients for whom it is medically rele-
vant.
(3) The company did not take advantage of its large cadre
of pharmaceutical representatives to inform relevant
groups of clinicians directly and in a timely manner about
Cardura's inferiority compared to low-dose diuretics
(chlorthalidone). In contrast, according to internal Pfizer
documents included in the Citizen Petition to the FDA
[23], the company developed a "Cardura ALLHAT Prepa-
ration Plan." As reported in the petition, though Pfizer
was fully aware of the ALLHAT results, its plan empha-
sized that "Cardura is one of the Magnificant 7 products
that counts for significant revenue and profit." It aggres-
sively continued to assure all "high-prescribers of Car-
dura" that Cardura was an "exceptionally safe drug."
Further, according to the petition and internal company
documents, the ALLHAT results were seen by Pfizer as a
potential threat to its business, regardless of whether the
trial findings were in the hands of its "competitors," "gov-
ernments . . . requesting label or price changes," or the
"press." Proactive steps were, therefore, needed. According
to testimony by a senior Pfizer executive quoted in the
petition, "the sales representatives to the best of my
knowledge are not proactively discussing ALLHAT" [23].
It appears that the trial results were treated as a marketing
problem rather than a public health issue.
(4) Pfizer did not inform the public through newspaper
ads or on TV about the inferiority of Cardura compared to
low-dose diuretics (chlorthalidone) for treatment of
hypertension. According to testimony by a senior Pfizer
executive, the company made a conscious decision "not to
issue a [public] statement on the ALLHAT results, because
doing so "would draw more attention to the situation."
[23]. Related to these failures, Pfizer was sued by two
patients as representatives of a class action lawsuit,
requesting in part that the company inform health care
professionals and the public about the inferiority of Car-
dura in the prevention of cardiovascular complications of
hypertension.
Market failure in information dissemination
It is no surprise to market theorists that the pharmaceuti-
cal industry has not lived up to social ideals in releasing
product information. The literature on the obligations of
corporations to society is large. The most widely quoted
author on the subject, Milton Friedman [25,26], claims
that corporate social responsibility is none other than that
of increasing profits, while operating under the rules of a
free market economy. These rules include free competi-
tion with other firms, in a manner in which there is no
fraud or deceit. Although more recent writings in the field
of business ethics acknowledge that corporations, like
individuals, have moral status and consequent ethical
obligations that go well beyond the rules of the market
[27-31], ethical arguments do not have strong persuasive
force with corporate leaders in the absence of some incen-Page 3 of 5
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ance. Therefore, as a matter of first principle, information
restrictions need to be examined as an aspect of market
failure, in order to craft effective solutions.
Economists explain that even a perfectly competitive mar-
ket often does not generate important consumer informa-
tion due to what economists refer to as a "public goods"
or "collective action" problem [32,33]. When many of the
costs or benefits of safety information extend far beyond
the parties to an immediate transaction, the information
will tend to be generated at suboptimal levels, since the
incentives affecting individual manufacturers and con-
sumers are poorly matched to broader social welfare. The
costs of obtaining and disseminating drug safety and
effectiveness information are certainly not trivial, but they
could be recouped from sales revenues, just as are research
and development costs. More significant, however, are
manufacturers' willingness to bear the reputational costs
of supplying this information when it is not favorable.
The absence of any market mechanism for compensating
manufacturers for this cost, or for inducing them to
absorb it, is a collective action problem. Thus, even if the
industry as a whole agreed that there is a collective need
for more extensive drug safety information, no single
manufacturer is likely to view it as an advantage to its
competitive stance to be the first to disseminate bad news
about its products. If other manufacturers are not disclos-
ing such information, and patients and physicians do not
expect it or demand it, then competition or reputational
rivalry does not compel manufacturers to do so.
Possible solutions
In our society, the public expects to be informed about
inferior products, whether they be drugs, tires, or automo-
biles. The ideal solution discussed above places a signifi-
cant degree of trust in the pharmaceutical industry to
protect public interests by providing not only favorable
but also unfavorable information about its products. A
voluntary effort to improve the dissemination of unfavo-
rable trials results would be desirable. All parties would
need to work together to establish and maintain trust and
to develop a system that protects the public's interest.
Pharmaceutical companies could benefit from an
improved public image and reputation and greater confi-
dence in the veracity of publications emanating from
industry-sponsored studies. Patients could benefit by get-
ting better care, and society would consequently benefit
from reduced utilization of health care services.
However, there is considerable debate in the business lit-
erature regarding the wisdom of a voluntary approach.
The "accountability theory" speaks to situations in which
there is an asymmetry of power and information between
the firm (the pharmaceutical company) and the stake-
holders (in our case the public, health care professionals,
and the health care system) (Swift 2001). Rather than
assuming any degree of trust between the firm and its
stakeholders, the accountability theory assumes that firms
cannot be trusted to act in the best interests of society
when there is a conflict between the two (e.g., when pro-
vision of information to stakeholders results in adverse
economic consequences to the firm.) Under this theory,
formal agreements and structural controls are substitutes
for trust, and shortfallings are addressed by regulation or
legislation to prevent them from occurring again [34].
Another solution would be an act of Congress to compel
pharmaceutical companies to report all material results
from clinical trials. An independent office would be
needed to systematically review the findings, to determine
which are clinically relevant and to assure timely and
effective communication of these. Other functions would
include monitoring industry's compliance with the regu-
lations and enforcing penalties for violations so that the
rights and interests of the public are protected. In the cur-
rent political climate, it is not likely that this degree of
industry oversight would be enacted, but that should not
deter leaders in the medical, public health, and public
policy fields from developing such a proposal and flesh-
ing out the details necessary to make this possibility more
concrete and visible.
A more market-oriented solution, similar to that used for
the quality of health plans, could be used. Each pharma-
ceutical firm could be rated by a government agency
according to how well it informs physicians and the pub-
lic about drug safety problems with its products. A visible
and meaningful rating system might effectively compel
the industry to improve its performance, without the gov-
ernment having to mandate or conduct the particular
aspects of performance. Or, more aggressively, the govern-
ment could give such a rating system more teeth by using
its purchasing power under Medicare, the Veteran's
Health Administration, and other government insurance
and health care programs to refuse to purchase or pay for
non-essential drugs from companies that perform poorly
under such a rating system. How these various alternatives
would actually function, and how well they would likely
address the problems, requires additional detailed analy-
sis.
Conclusions
The current system for timely, complete and unbiased dis-
semination of unfavorable trial results fails, to a large
extent, to protect public interests. Pharmaceutical compa-
nies do not serve social welfare as well as they could. Var-
ious strategies may be used to withhold critical drug
information from health care providers and patients. For
research findings that are likely to reduce drug sales,Page 4 of 5
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efforts may be made to delay their publication [1], to sup-
press their release [2-4] or to give trial results a more pos-
itive "spin" [6,7].
An ideal solution to the problem would be a voluntary
joint effort by all parties to improve the dissemination
process. This would require major trust in the pharmaceu-
tical industry, which currently controls what, when and
how unfavorable research findings are communicated to
health care providers and the public. A disincentive to
industry would be reduced sales of inferior, less safe and
inadequately tested drugs. Therefore, a more realistic
approach is legislative or regulatory action to compel
timely, complete and unbiased reporting of vital clinical
trial results, or at least to call the public's and medical pro-
fession's attention to each pharmaceutical firm that fails
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